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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Daniel Lee Eby appeals from the district court's order denying his petition 
for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts of the underlying criminal 
case as follows: 
According to the State's evidence, the victim, Mel Evenson, 
was murdered late in the night of March 25 or early the next 
morning. On that night, Daniel Eby, Jeremy Schmitz, Cliff Hicks 
and Evenson were working on cars in a garage belonging to Gerald 
Smith. Inside the adjacent residence were Smith and several other 
individuals. While in the garage, Evenson was repeatedly struck in 
the head with a baseball bat and with a large wrench. His clothing 
was removed and was then burned in a wood stove in the garage. 
Evenson's body was wrapped in a tarp and placed in the bed of his 
own truck. The body was then covered with flattened cardboard 
boxes, and the truck was abandoned in the countryside. 
State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 536, 37 P.3d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
"It was the prosecution's theory that, on the evening in question, Eby, 
Schmitz and Hicks believed that Evenson was carrying a substantial amount of 
narcotics and cash because he had just returned from an out-of-town drug 
transaction, and the three decided to kill Evenson in order to steal his money and 
drugs." !fl In statements admitted at the subsequent trial, Eby told detectives 
that on the night of the murder, he stood guard while Hicks and Schmitz beat 
Evenson to death, searched his clothes for drugs and money, and then 
concealed the body. !fl at 539, 37 P.3d at 630. 
The state ultimately charged Eby with first degree murder under 
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alternative theories of felony murder and premeditation, conspiracy to commit 
robbery, and attempted robbery. ~ at 536, 539, 37 P.3d at 627, 630. A jury 
found Eby guilty of all charges. ~ at 536, 37 P.3d at 627. The district court 
imposed a unified life sentence with twenty-five years fixed for first-degree 
murder, and concurrent lesser sentences for conspiracy to commit robbery and 
attempted robbery. ~ 
On direct appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Eby's convictions 
for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit robbery, but reversed Eby's 
conviction for attempted robbery, holding that that offense merged with the 
conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder theory. ~ at 536-541, 
37 P.3d at 627-632. 
Eby filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. See Eby v. 
State, 148 Idaho 731, 733, 228 P.3d 998, 1000 (2010). The district court 
appointed counsel to represent him on the petition. ~ Over the next several 
years, Eby's various appointed attorneys failed to amend his petition or otherwise 
advance Eby's claims. ~ at 733-734, 228 P.3d at 1000-1001. The district court 
dismissed the petition for inactivity. ~ at 733, 228 P.3d at 1000. The court later 
denied Eby's I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from the dismissal order, concluding 
that I.R.C.P. 60(b) does not apply to I.R.C.P. 40(c) dismissals for inactivity. Id. 
at 734, 228 P.3d at 1001. 
Eby appealed, and the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
I.R.C.P. 60(b) does apply to I.R.C.P. 40(c) dismissals. ~ at 734-738, 228 P.3d 
at 1001-1005. The Court remanded the case for consideration of whether the 
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facts presented by Eby constituted grounds for relief in this case. lfL On 
remand, the district court granted such relief, withdrawing its previously entered 
dismissal of Eby's post-conviction petition. (R., p.4.) 
Through new appointed counsel, Eby filed an amended petition for post-
conviction relief with supporting affidavit raising three claims: (1) that he was 
denied his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel; (2) that there were material 
facts not previously presented and heard that required a vacating of his 
conviction in the interest of justice pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4 ); and (3) that 
his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to adequately 
communicate with him, failing to advise him of his rights, failing to adequately 
prepare for trial, and for preventing Eby from testifying on his own behalf. (R., 
pp.6-10; Supp. R., 1 pp.2-8.) The district court took judicial notice of the 
underlying criminal case file, 2 ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held, and 
entertained pre- and post-evidentiary hearing briefing from the parties. (R., 
pp.13-14, 21-31, 34-48; see 7/5/11 Tr.) 
In a memorandum decision, the district court denied Eby's petition for 
post-conviction relief, concluding that Eby failed to meet his burden to show he 
1 A Supplemental Clerk's Record with additional documents was prepared after 
Eby objected to the record. (Supp. R., pp.21-23.) 
2 While the district court took judicial notice of the entire underlying criminal case 
file, the Idaho Supreme Court has not done the same with regard to this appeal. 
Missing portions of record are presumed to support decision of trial court. State 
v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996). 
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was entitled to relief. (R., pp.49-59.) Eby timely appealed.3 (R., pp.60-62.) 
3 The SAPD was appointed to represent Eby in his appeal. (R., pp.63-65.} 
However, the SAPD subsequently withdrew from the representation of Eby 
based on their inability to "find a viable issue for appeal." (6/7/12 Memorandum 
In Support of Motion to Withdraw, p. 6; 7/6/12 Order Granting Motion for Leave to 
Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.) Eby has proceeded in the 
appeal prose. (See Appellant's brief.) 
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ISSUES 
Eby states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the District Court Error [sic] In Denying Mr. Eby's Conflict 
of Interest Claim's [sic]? 
B. Did The District Court Error [sic] In Denying Mr. Eby's 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim's [sic]? 
(Appellant's brief, p.2.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Eby failed to show error in the district court's denial of his petition for 
post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Eby Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court's Denial Of His Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing 
A Introduction 
Eby asserts that the district court erred in denying his petition for post-
conviction relief. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) Eby, however, has failed to 
assign any specific error to the district court and has instead simply repeated his 
post-conviction claims in his Appellant's brief. (lg_,_) In any event, the record 
reveals that Eby failed to meet his burden to show he was entitled to post-
conviction relief, and that the district court thus did not err in denying his petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings 
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of 
law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). A trial court's decision that a post-
conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. 
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939,940, 792 P.2d 964,965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, 
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the 
province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 
110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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C. Eby Is Not Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief 
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil 
proceedings in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 
567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 
838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)). 
In this case, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Eby's post-
conviction claims, but concluded that he failed to meet his burden to show he 
was entitled to relief. (R., pp.49-59; 7/5/11 Tr.) In his statement of issues, Eby 
asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his post-conviction claims. 
(Appellant's brief, p.2.) Eby, however, fails to assign any specific error to the 
district court regarding any of these claims. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) 
This Court should affirm the district court's denial of Eby's petition on this basis. 
State v. Walker, 121 Idaho 18, 20, 822 P.2d 537, 539 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding 
than an appellate court will not search the record for unspecified error nor 
presume error); see also State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 
(1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, 
authority, or argument, they will not be considered."). 
In any event, a review of the record reveals that the district court did not 
err in concluding that Eby failed to meet his burden to show he was entitled to 
relief on any of his claims. 
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1. Eby Failed To Show That His Sixth Amendment Right To Conflict-
Free Representation Was Violated 
The right to conflict-free representation derives from the Sixth Amendment 
as applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1931 ). The right has been 
accorded "not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of 
the accused to receive a fair trial." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002) 
(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)). It follows from this that 
assistance which is ineffective in preserving fairness does not meet the 
constitutional mandate. State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 296, 90 P.3d 278, 
285 (2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
Where a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel conflict-
based claim alleging his counsel's personal interests directly conflict with 
counsel's obligation to provide effective representation, the defendant must 
demonstrate that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his 
lawyer's performance. Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 61-62, 90 P.3d at 286-287; see 
also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (where defendant alleges a 
conflict based upon his counsel's simultaneous representation of defendant and 
the prosecutor's key witness, defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict 
of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance). Absent such a showing, 
a defendant is not entitled to reversal of his conviction. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 
173-74; Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987). 
An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel, not by whether there 
is a "mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 172 n.5. 
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"[T]he possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction." 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 62, 106 P.3d 376, 388 (2004) (citations omitted). 
An actual conflict will be shown to adversely affect counsel's performance where 
a link between counsel's deficient performance and the conflict of interest is 
demonstrated. See Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004); see also 
United States v. Burns, 526 F.3d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 2008) (actual conflict 
adversely affects counsel's performance when "there was some plausible 
alternative defense strategy that could have been pursued, but was not, because 
of the actual conflict"). 
Under most circumstances, a conflict of one attorney with an individual is 
automatically "imputed" to the other attorneys in his or her firm. See State v. 
Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 792-793, 171 P.3d 1282, 1290-1291 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing 
Smith v. State, 126 Idaho 106, 110, 878 P.2d 805, 809 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
Therefore, there is generally a per se conflict of interest where attorneys in a 
single law firm concurrently represent individuals with adverse interests. See 
Cook, 144 Idaho at 792-793; 171 P.3d at 1290-1291. However, in Cook, the -- --
Idaho Court of Appeals held that there is no such per se conflict where different 
attorneys within a public defender's office concurrently represent individuals with 
adverse interests. kl at 791-794, 171 P.3d at 1289-1292. The Court recognized 
that "automatically disqualifying a public defender where another attorney in the 
office has a conflict of interest would significantly hamper the ability to provide 
legal representation of indigent clients," and that "such concurrent representation 
by public defenders generally will create no incentive (economic or otherwise) for 
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diminished advocacy in such cases." _kl at 794, 171 P.3d at 1292. Instead, 
such conflict questions should be addressed by trial courts on a case-by-case 
basis, where the court takes individual situations into consideration to determine 
whether a defendant's right to counsel is threatened by competing interests . .kl 
In this case, Eby asserted that his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free 
representation was violated because he was represented by two deputy 
attorneys of the Kootenai County Public Defender's Office, while one of his co-
defendants, who made statements to police implicating Eby in the murder, was 
represented by the Kootenai County Public Defender, who had supervisory 
authority over the deputies. (R., pp. 7 -8, 28-29, 34-37.) 
However, the district court correctly concluded that Eby failed to show a 
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. (R., pp.53-55.) Citing Cook, the district 
court both recognized that there was no per se bar to the Kootenai County Public 
Defender's Office's representation of both Eby and his co-defendant, and 
conducted an appropriate analysis of the concurrent representation employed in 
this case. (Id.) 
The district court made the unchallenged factual finding that the Kootenai 
County Public Defender's Office erected a "Chinese wall"4 that separated the 
representations of Eby and his co-defendant. (R., pp.51-52.) When such a "wall" 
is in place, there is no discussion or exchange of information between attorneys 
potentially implicated by a conflict. (7/5/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.2-11; p.47, Ls.13-22.) 
4 At the evidentiary hearing, Eby's appointed trial attorneys and the Kootenai 
County Public Defender testified that "Chinese walls" were a common practice of 
the office at the time of its representation of Eby, but are no longer preferred. 
(7/5/11 Tr., p.13, L.20- p.14, L.8; p.25, L.4- p.26, L.9; p.47, L.7 -p.48, L.7.) 
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Eby's appointed attorneys testified that there was nothing about the concurrent 
representation that affected any of the decisions they made representing Eby. 
(R., pp.51-52.) Eby did not show that the "Chinese wall" was compromised in 
this particular case, nor did Eby identify any specific adverse effect of the 
concurrent representation. (R., pp.54-55.) 
Because Eby failed to assign specific error to the district court in its 
rejection of his claim that he was denied conflict-free counsel, this Court should 
decline to consider this issue on appeal. In any event, the record reveals that the 
district court properly concluded that Eby failed to show that the Kootenai County 
Public Defender's Office's concurrent representation of Eby and his co-defendant 
hampered Eby's counsel's ability to effectively represent him. Eby thus failed to 
show that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. 
2. Eby Failed To Show That Material Evidence Not Previously 
Presented Required Vacation Of His Conviction Pursuant To I.C. § 
19-4901 (a)(4) 
A petitioner for post conviction relief may claim, as grounds for relief, 
"[t]hat there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and 
heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interests of 
justice." I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4). 
In his petition, Eby asserted that there existed such material facts that 
required a vacating of his conviction, but he did not identify any such facts in 
either his petition or pre-evidentiary hearing briefing. (R., pp.8, 28-31.) At the 
evidentiary hearing, Eby shed some light on this claim, testifying that his cousin 
"alleged [Eby] had a splitting maul, sledge hammer or a pipe wrench and that 
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[Eby] hit Mr. Evenson with it," and that this allegation was inconsistent "with the 
autopsy [which] showed that a baseball bat killed [Evenson.]" (7/5/11 Tr., p.104, 
Ls.15-18; p.108, Ls.12-20.) In his post-hearing briefing, Eby asserted that "this 
information was not presented to the jury and in the interests of justice this 
requires that Mr. Eby's [p]etition be granted." (R., pp.37-38.) 
In rejecting Eby's assertion, the district court stated that it was "not 
persuaded by [Eby's] testimony that the weapon he was alleged to have used 
could not have caused the injuries, because Dr. Bernard, the State's expert at 
trial, testified that the injuries were all caused by similar weapons." (R., p.58.) 
Indeed, Dr. Bernard testified at trial that while "some type of cylindrical object" 
inflicted the injuries to Evenson's skull, he could not determine whether the 
injuries to Evenson's head and ribs were all inflicted with the same weapon, or 
even specifically what type of weapon was utilized. (See R., pp.44-46.) The 
district court continued, "[Eby's] testimony then, while not previously heard, is not 
evidence that the jury did not consider at trial." (R., p.58.) 
Further, Eby was convicted under a felony murder theory, which did not 
require that he directly participated in Evenson's murder. Eby 136 Idaho at 537-
540, 37 P.3d at 628-642 (holding that the admission of inadmissible hearsay 
statements from Eby's co-defendant that Eby beat Evenson was harmless 
because the properly admitted evidence at Eby's trial "overwhelmingly proves 
that [Eby] participated in the attempted robbery that culminated in the murder of 
Evenson"). No evidence or new argument by Eby regarding whether he directly 
participated in the murder, regardless of how persuasive it was, would require a 
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vacating of his conviction in the interest of justice where he was ultimately 
convicted merely of participating in the attempted robbery that culminated in 
Evenson's murder. 
Because Eby failed to assign specific error to the district court in its denial 
of his I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4) claim, this Court should not consider this claim on 
appeal. In any event, the record reveals that Eby failed to present evidence of 
material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of his 
conviction in the interest of justice. Eby has thus failed to show that the district 
court erred in denying this post-conviction clam. 
3. Eby Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel 
A petitioner seeking relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
must prove "that his counsel was deficient in his performance and that this 
deficiency resulted in prejudice." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 
1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 
424 (1989)). 
"To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to show 
that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was 
competent and diligent." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 
367-68 (2008) (internal citations omitted). To meet this burden "requires showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687. "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on 
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appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Baldwin, 
145 Idaho at 153-54, 177 P.3d at 367-68. 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
In his post-conviction petition, Eby raised an ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim that contained several sub-claims: (1) his trial counsel failed to 
adequately communicate with him; (2) his trial counsel failed to advise him of his 
rights; (3) his trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial; and (4) his trial 
counsel prevented Eby from testifying on his own behalf. (R., pp.6-1 O; Supp. R., 
pp.2-8.) In its response brief, the state argued that each of Eby's ineffective 
assistance of counsel sub-claims was either conclusory and unsupported, or 
disproved by Eby's written not guilty plea and transcript of the sentencing 
hearing. (R., pp.23-27.) In reply, Eby did not dispute that his claims were 
unsupported, but asserted that he would "establish his claims for [post-
conviction] relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel through his 
[evidentiary hearing] testimony." (R., pp.29-30.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, Eby's trial attorneys testified that they had 
limited independent recollection of their representation of Eby. (7/5/11 Tr., p.21, 
L.24 - p.89, L.11.) However, as summarized by the district court, they also 
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testified that they had a "regular practice and policy of informing clients of their 
rights, preparing for trial, explaining legal procedures, and consulting clients with 
regard to trial and sentencing strategy." (R., p.57.) The district court specifically 
found these attorneys' testimony to be more "substantive and credible" than 
Eby's testimony that he "could not remember the proceedings, but he could 
remember that his attorneys failed to consult with him regarding his rights, the 
legal procedures, and the strategy at trial and sentencing." (R., pp.56-57.) 
Finally, the district court concluded that Eby failed to show how he was 
prejudiced by any deficiency. (R., p.57.) 
In his Appellant's brief, other than in his statement of issues on appeal, 
Eby has entirely failed to either assign specific error to the district court in 
denying his ineffective assistance of trial claim, or even discuss the ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims he raised below. (See generally, Appellant's 
brief.) This Court should thus decline to consider this issue. In any event, the 
record reveals that the district court properly considered and denied Eby's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Eby's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 1st day of November 2012 
~Y.-t/\ 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of November 2012, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
DANI EL LEE EBY 
IDOC #56540 
ISCI 
PO Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 38707 
MWO/pm 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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